[ 蘇潔澈 ]——(2013-10-24) / 已閱26803次
[25]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p.742.
[26]P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p. 408.
[27]E. H. Hupkes, Special Bank Resolution and Shareholders’Rights: Balancing Competing Interests, p.23； A. Campbell＆P Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response,pp. 126-128.
[28]S. 99 of the Banking Act 2009；R. Tomasic, “Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform after the Collapse of Northern Rock Part 2” （2009） 22 Insolvency Intelligence 83；E. Avgouleas, “ Banking Supervision and the Special Resolu-tion Regime of the Banking Act 2009：the Unfinished Reform” （2009） 4（2） Capital Markets Law Journal 224.
[29]British Bankers’ Association Response to the Tripartite Discussion Paper: Banking Reform-Protecting Depositors, p. 11，ht-tp://www. bba. org. uk/content/1/c6/01/16/48/BBA_Response_to_Tripartite_DP_-_Banking-Reform. pdf，訪問時間：2013年1月15日。
[30]美國“聯(lián)邦存款保險公司”的某些監(jiān)管性決定可以不舉行聽證，也不受司法審查。許多東歐國家的銀行法也有類似的規(guī)定。Art. 21 （5） of the Banks Act 1997 （ Bulgaria）；G. A. Gegenheimer, “Judicial Review of Bank Supervisory Deci-sions in the Former Soviet Republics: The Case of Kyrgyzstan” （2006） 25 Annual Review of Banking＆Financial Law 249.
[31]Yuen Kun Yen v. AG of Hong Kong[1988] AC 175，185；Three Rivers D. C v. Bank of England [2000] 2 W. L. R. 15；Franklin Savings Corp. v. U. S,385 F. 3d 1279 , （10th Cir 2004）．關(guān)于金融監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的侵權(quán)責(zé)任制度，參見蘇潔澈：《論銀行監(jiān)管機構(gòu)侵權(quán)責(zé)任—以銀行破產(chǎn)和英美法為例》，《法學(xué)家》2011年第1期。
[32]有學(xué)者認(rèn)為，監(jiān)管機構(gòu)經(jīng)常出于自身政治利益考量，而延遲關(guān)閉問題銀行。J. R. Macey ＆ G. P. Miller, “Kaye, Scho-ler, FIRREA, and The Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case from the Perspective of Bank Regu-latory Policy”（1993）66 Southern California Law Review 1133.
[33]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”，p.477.
[34]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again” ,p.523.
[35]J. R. Macey, G. P. Miller＆R. S. Carnell, Banking Law and Regulation, Aspen Law＆Business, 2001，p. 307；D. G.Mayes,“ Some Rules for Cross-border Banks in Europe” （2009） 10 European Business Organization Law Review 213.
[36]P. P. Swire, “Bank Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again”，p.488.
[37]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”，in R. M. Lastra＆H. N. Schiffman（eds.），Bank Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition,Kluwer, 1999，p.111.
[38]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”．p.115.
[39]J. R. Macey, “Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice”（1998） 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 268.
[40]D. A. Skeel, “The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation”（1998） 76 Texas Law Review 729.
[41]H. M. Schooner,“Bank Insolvency Regimes in the United States and the United Kingdom” （2005）18 The Transnational Lawyer 389.
[42]G. N. Olson, “Government Intervention: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experi-ence”，p.114.
[43]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges”，IMF Confer-ence, May 28, 2004, http://imf. org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/mk. pdf，訪問時間：2012年10月30日。
[44]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies”（1994） 107 Harvard Law Review 507，508-532;關(guān)于母公司與子公司的責(zé)任問題研究，見余勁松：《跨國公司法律問題專論》，法律出版社2008年版。
[45]H. Jackson, “The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies” ,p. 529；G. N. Olson,“Government Interven-tion: the Inadequacy of Bank Insolvency Resolution-Lesson from the American Experience”，p.114.
[46]M. H. Krimminger, “Deposit Insurance and Bank Insolvency in a Changing World: Synergies and Challenges' .
[47]FDICv．Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1109 （1st Cir.1986）.
[48]Notes, “Creditors’ Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National Bank”（1986） 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1440；How-ell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574（1 st Cir. 1993 ）．
[49]FDIC v. Ernst＆Young, 374 F 3d 579，582 （7th Cir.2004）．
[50]為刺激經(jīng)濟增長，央行長期維持低息政策，從而鼓勵了銀行的過度放貸；而監(jiān)管機構(gòu)則為了避免儲蓄機構(gòu)的破產(chǎn)，修改了通行的會計準(zhǔn)則，這導(dǎo)致了大量本應(yīng)破產(chǎn)的儲蓄機構(gòu)沒有及時被破產(chǎn)，最終導(dǎo)致了公共資金更大的損失。關(guān)于美國儲蓄危機的發(fā)展和法律變革，參見M. S. Tammen, “The Saving and Loan Crisis: Which Train Derailed-Regula-tion or Deposit Insurance?”（1990） 6 Journal of Law and Politics 311，319。
[51]G. J. Beston＆G. G. Kaufman, “FDICIA after Five Years”（1997） 11 （3） The Journal of Economic Perspectives 150.
[52]Hinder v. FDIC 137 F. 3d 148（1998）；Franklin Savings Association v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision 934 F. 2d 1127（10th Cir 1991）；Howell v. FDIC, 986 F. 2d 569 574（1st Cir. 1993 ）；Maccarthy v. FDIC 348 F. 3d 1075（9th Cir 2003）：Golden Pacific Bank Corp. v. FDIC,375 F. 3d 196 （2d Cir. 2004）．
[53]關(guān)于英國2009年前的銀行管理制度，參見A. Campbell ＆ P. Cartwright, Banks in Crisis: The Legal Response, pp. 120 -145。
[54]相關(guān)機構(gòu)主要是指監(jiān)管機構(gòu)，英格蘭銀行和財政部，某一機構(gòu)申請破產(chǎn)令應(yīng)當(dāng)取得另外一個機構(gòu)的同意。2009年《銀行法》第141條規(guī)定法院任命銀行臨時管理人。
[55]下列國家在其立法中給予了金融監(jiān)管機構(gòu)法定的保護(hù)：英國、美國、德國、澳大利亞、新加坡、南非等。參見R. S.Delston, Statutory Protection for Banking Supervisors,（1999） World Bank Financial Sector Website Paper No.4，http : /www1. worldbank. org/finance/html/statutory_protection. html，訪問時間：2013年3月5日。
[56]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[57]IMF, An Overview of the Legal, Institutional, and Regulatory Framework for Bank Insolvency, p. 12.
[58]Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, John Wiley, 1996, p. 309；BIS, Bank Failure in Mature Econ-omies（2004）,Working Paper No. 13. http://www. bis. org/publ/bcbs_wp13. pdf，訪問時間：2013年3月5日。
出處:《環(huán)球法律評論》2013年第2期
作者單位：中國人民大學(xué)法學(xué)院
總共4頁 [1] [2] [3] 4
上一頁
